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Esse, Procession, Creation: Reinterpreting Aquinas
Peter Harris
Two Approaches to Speculative Inquiry
It is fashionable to re-validate medieval thinking for the contemporary world by
assuming that while medieval theological speculation is no longer of much
interest, other than as a kind of archaeology of the medieval mind, there is quite
a lot of philosophically interesting material to be recovered from the debris of
medieval speculation, more particularly in the field of logic and cognate
interests.  This view succeeds in missing a great deal of what is of significance1
in the field of speculative metaphysics. For example the significance of the
distinction between esse subsistens or subsistent existing and esse commune or
existing in general tends to be overlooked. Yet it is vital to the kind of synthesis
of philosophical and theological speculation with which many of the medieval
thinkers were preoccupied. It links them back via the Islamic and Jewish thinkers
to figures such as Augustine and even to Philo who endeavoured to reconcile
religious faith with the philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle.
What follows is an essay in drawing out the implications of Aquinas’s
philosophico-theological synthesis with regard to a contemporary revaluation of
the notion of creative order.  2
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The notion of subsistent existing is what is required for an account of
existing beings to be complete and in that sense self-explanatory–in other words
an account which includes within itself all the conditions that are  necessary for
its realisation. It is closely akin to what Spinoza, for example, understood by
“substance” or Hegel by “absolute Idea.” However, in both Spinoza and Hegel,
the theological mode of thinking has been resolved into the philosophical and, so
to speak, transcended. For Aquinas and his contemporaries such a resolution
would have involved the abandonment of the primacy of faith and revelation.
Philosophical inquiry was a necessary adjunct in the overall theological project
of fides quaerens intellectum, faith seeking an understanding of itself. Yet it was
in this context that absolutely key concepts such as that of subsistent relations
were in fact elaborated. No doubt this is why later Protestant theology would
accuse the schoolmen of theological rationalism. But in the medieval period,
thinkers like Berengarius, Anselm and Abelard had strenuously attempted to
uncover the inherent intelligibility of what was held by Christian faith, even while
holding that the substance of these truths might be beyond unaided human reason
to discover. The de facto outcome of this endeavour was an elaborate but brilliant
intermeshing of material derived from Greek philosophy with the requirements
of the essential Christian doctrines. In what follows we shall hope to see how this
works in the doctrines of Trinity and Creation, to produce a synthesis which goes
far beyond what Hegel was inclined to write off  as merely “representational
thinking.”
In what follows, St. Thomas Aquinas will be taken as exemplary.
Although other important syntheses of philosophical and theological speculation
are to be found in the period, notably thinkers of the Franciscan tradition,
Bonaventure, Duns Scotus and Ockham particularly,  Aquinas is perhaps
particularly notable for the systematic nature of his attempt to explore the
philosophical elaboration of concepts essential to an explication of the
metaphysical dimensions of Christian thought. It has to be noted at once that
Aquinas continued to maintain that the doctrine of the Trinity constituted an
understanding of the nature of God which was in principle beyond the power of
human reason, unaided by divine revelation to discover.  The same would hold
true also of important aspects of the doctrine of Creation, even though the
essential notion of the ontological dependence of all finite beings on an infinite
being could be reached by way of argumentation from the most general
characteristics of the beings of which we have knowledge by way of sense
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perception.  Nevertheless, in the elaboration of a theological understanding of3
these revealed doctrines, Aquinas clearly draws upon a vast array of material
derived ultimately from philosophical sources–most particularly from Aristotle
and the neo-Platonists. Although officially the “handmaid of theology” the
genuinely philosophical nature of the elaboration of the concepts of esse, of
immanence, of subsistent relations, of transcendental attributes, of analogical
predication and of real, virtual and logical distinctions is very clear. It could be
argued that de facto what we have here is a consciously theological ingression
into a tradition of thought in which the distinction of theology and philosophy is
not only often unclear, but is of itself much less important than might have
seemed at the time. This is particularly true in light of the developments to which
it gives rise in later philosophical theories.
The present essay raises the question of reading back the implications of
the trinitarian theology into Aquinas’s strong theory of existence or esse in such
a way as to amplify its contribution to speculative philosophy. It therefore
involves a transgression of the formal boundaries of metaphysics and theology as
these were recognised in the world of medieval speculation, yet in a manner that
can surely be counted as a valid “retrieval” of what is at least implicit there.4
Esse subsistens and esse commune
It is well known that the most fundamental or primordial conception of Aquinas’s
metaphysics is the notion of esse or of “being,” understood in a verbal or active
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sense.  Esse grounds all possibility of anything being something; it is the most5
primitive notion of what we have termed speculative metaphysics. Anything else
is in some way or another a particular determination of being understood in this
sense. Form and essence are determinations or limitations not of an entity but of
an activity, the activity of esse–unless of course we have already understood
“entity” in an active sense.  If there were something for which there is required
no principle of determination or limitation, it would be a subsistent esse. The
arguments that Aquinas rehearses in question 2 of the Summa Theologica are
designed to show that if beings exist which are not of this subsistent kind, that can
only be by way of an intrinsic dependence on that which does subsist, or contains
within itself all the conditions of its own existence. We are not particularly
concerned here with the validity of such arguments–this question has been the
source of endless discussion in philosophical theology–but rather with the notion
of subsistent existence as a feature of this particular metaphysical landscape. The
connection with speculative theology is established by the recognition that a
“being” of this kind is what all human beings understand as God.  But so far as6
unaided reason is concerned there is little more of a positive nature that we can
say, though a great deal can be said by way of negation. Where all other beings,
known to us through experience are finite, contingent, caused and limited, this
reality is infinite, necessary, uncaused. Consequently the name most appropriate
to it is “The one who is.” In our present condition we can attain to no real grasp
of his essence other than that “he possesses esse itself as an infinite and
indeterminate [in the sense of unlimited] sea of substance.”  We should note of7
course that the medieval thinkers’s notion of this subsistent existence is by no
means the same as Hegel’s notion of the indeterminate but empty concept of
being. It is indeterminate precisely because it is sheer existence or esse, unlimited
by any particular essential form.  But the story does not end with this powerfully
agnostic view, and this for two reasons. 
First, a number of important attributions can be affirmed of God precisely
as the source and origin of all finite being. All the positive characteristics or
Harris140
 It is at this point that the characteristically jejune dilemmas surrounding the notions of divine8
omniscience and omnipotence which characterise a good deal of what goes by way of “philosophy
of religion” are found to be lacking a more robust account of the medieval idea of God.
“perfections” of finite beings must be attributed to God as their source. This
attribution has a necessarily negative side, in that such characteristics are realised
in God in a manner consonant with perfect simplicity and therefore not as they are
realised in the beings of which we have direct experience; and at the same time
they are attributed to him in an eminent way, that is as the source of such
characteristics by way of causation and participation. In this way are attributed
to God such things as infinite power, truth, goodness, life, knowledge and will.
Second–and here the transition to a properly theological inquiry is
evident–as a consequence of divine revelation, this slate of attributions is
significantly enriched and explored through the recognition that the nature of the
divine life is disclosed through the revelatory activity of God in human history.
The belief that the life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, are the
culminating events in the divine Word becoming flesh and the sending of the
Holy Spirit give rise to the specification of divine life as essentially triune and
relational in nature. Suddenly, the bare attributions of the earlier approach take
on a detail and specificity in which the notion of esse subsistens burgeons into a
complex of processions and relations though which the structure of divine life is
spelled out in the doctrine of the Trinity, and this in turn gives rise to the doctrine
of divine creation of the world. 
It would be a mistake to understand this theological enrichment as
rationally unfounded speculation. Here the philosophical tradition of Plato,
Aristotle and the neo-Platonists provide the means by which this doctrine is
elaborated. The Good “beyond being” and the indefinite dyad of Plato, the notion
of God as thought thinking itself, imparting to the cosmos a finality of attraction,
and the emanations of divine mind and divine soul in Plotinus are all deployed in
a new and impressive synthesis in a metaphysical understanding of the chief
Christian doctrines.8
All of this remains to be explored in more detail in the understanding of
the Trinitarian relations and the emanation–creation of the world of finite beings
from them. The point for the moment however is to draw attention to a
fundamental difference in what might be called the two planes of existence, that
of esse subsistens and the existence common to all finite beings, what is termed
esse commune. Some care is needed in the understanding of this distinction. The
medieval thinkers insist that esse is not a genus of which there are specifically
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different kinds, because genus always relates to an essence or nature of some
kind, however generalised. Esse, or being in the active sense is that primitive
activity which is the placing of things in existence, not the kind of beings that
they are. The way in which esse or existence is affirmed of God is different from
the way in which it is affirmed of anything else. God’s existence is entirely
unconditioned, independent and self-sufficient. The existence of everything else
is conditioned and derived. This latter kind of existence is what is meant by the
general term esse commune and is the proper subject matter of metaphysics.
The reason for emphasising this apparently abstruse distinction is to
establish in advance the limit of the carry-over of the essential characteristics of
divine life into the beings that are derived from it by way of creation–emanation.
It would be convenient, to say the least, if, having discovered the essential
relationality of divine being, we could extend this characteristic to all derived or
dependent being. But although for the medievals God is entirely immanent in the
created world, his being is not confused with it. There is not even a hint of
pantheism in the medieval doctrine of divine immanence. Having said this of
course we will be anxious to see whether this theologically vouchsafed theory of
relational being has any significant resonance or carryover in the understanding
of dependent or finite being.
Triunity, Order and Intelligibility
The most general theme of the present study in speculative metaphysics is an
inquiry into the nature of the activity of actualization, which we have seen as
deriving from a consideration of what we will call “strong” theories of existence.9
It is clear that the metaphysical view that is at work in Aquinas’s theology is a
strong theory of existence. Esse or existence precedes every further determination
by way of genus and difference. It is true that a metaphysics of being in the active
sense, a metaphysics of actualization, can be extracted from Aquinas’s theological
writing and was indeed explored by him at length in his more purely
philosophical works. But ultimately the metaphysics of existence looks for its
completion to the relation of what is termed esse commune to that kind of esse
which is ultimate in the order of explanation, the esse subsistens in which all
finite beings participate and therefore on which they depend in the order of
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explanation. But it is also the view of Aquinas that esse subsistens, although
argued to by philosophical reasoning, depends for its fullest explication on the
theological inquiry into the nature of divine being. This is to be found in the
theological elaboration of divine life as essentially relational. It is this analysis of
divine life as a matter of relational order which completes the requirement that a
strong theory of existence be ultimate in order of explanation and in that sense
self-explanatory. How and to what extent this view can be extended to found a
view of all kinds of being whether infinite or finite is the object of what follows.
Before continuing, it may be useful to note a matter which is central to
the metaphysics of Aquinas and was to become a source of some disagreement on
the part of his most outstanding successor, and to some extent critic, John Duns
Scotus. If, as Aquinas believes, the movement of thought from finite esse
commune to its ultimate source in esse subsistens entails a qualitative, perhaps
better, “intensive” difference, then some account must be given as to how the
transition is made intelligibly so as to avoid a kind of metaphysical aphasia and
agnosticism. This is a particularly crucial question for Aquinas since he insists
that all human understanding of things takes its rise from, and is inherently
limited by, what we might now term the empirical sources of knowledge–nihil in
intellectu nisis prius in sensu (nothing in the mind which does not take its rise
from sense perception). The key concept that Aquinas uses in this context is that
of analogical predication. The theory of analogy [of being] erects a conceptual
structure between what we can predicate of finite beings, ultimately grounded in
human experience and what is predicated of God, whether on the ground of
metaphysical argument (as in the “five ways” and their elaboration ) or on the10
ground of divine revelation (as in the theological elaboration of the divine nature
in the subsequent questions of The Summa Theologica, part I.). According to this
view, metaphysical reasoning is competent to establish a link of causality and
participation between finite and unconditioned being. God is understood as the
universal cause of each and every feature of finite beings and all positive
characteristics of finite beings are in some sense ‘participations’ in divine
perfection.  On the ground of this link, both the essential similarity and the
essential difference between esse commune and esse subsistens is affirmed at one
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 The transition is concealed to a considerable extent because theological sources have already been13
deployed in Aquinas’s discussion of the attributes of God, particularly of the notion of divine
providence, but also in the discussion of God as possessing intellect and will. But it has to be
remembered that right from the beginning, this Summa is primarily a theological work, designed for
the teaching of theology, not metaphysics as Aquinas makes abundantly clear in the very first, and
often neglected Question 1. Interpreting the ST correctly depends on taking what Aquinas has to say
there about theological science with full seriousness. Aquinas develops these matters more fully in
his Commentary on Boethius’s de Trinitate 1, q. 1 and 2.
 The inter-weaving of more properly philosophical with religious and theological thought in the14
ancient and medieval world is very much more complex than is sometimes thought. A very great
deal of patristic theology already draws heavily on philosophical sources and the syntheses of the
and the same time. It is on this analogical bridge that Aquinas is able to found
various attributions derived from our most general understanding of the nature of
the beings of our experience. Duns Scotus on the other hand, who does not rely
so heavily on the notion of esse for his metaphysical theory of being, argues that
if we are not to be caught up ultimately in equivocation, we have to recognise that
being is a univocal concept and additionally that one of its transcendental
attributes is a disjunctive requirement that it be either infinite or finite.11
The relative weight of metaphysical and more properly theological
reasoning, at least as far as Aquinas’s Summa Theologica is concerned, is to a
considerable extent concealed by the admirable continuity of the overall
development of that work. Establishing that God is one, infinite, living and
possessed of intellect and will is within the reach of metaphysical reasoning–these
attributes can be understood as the negatively qualified attributes of ipsum esse
existens which is the proper definition of God.  In addition they serve as the12
bridge to the domain of theologically founded reasoning, although the transition,
at least in The Summa Theologica is scarcely noticeable. It occurs most obviously
at the point at which Aquinas puts the question: whether in God there is any
procession?  In Aquinas’s view, the foundations of Trinitarian doctrine stem13
from divine revelation, without which this aspect of divine life could not be
known. Nevertheless, the theological elaboration of these fundamental articles of
faith picks up and deploys in new ways philosophical notions derived from Plato,
Aristotle, middle-Platonists like Philo, and particularly from Plotinus and the
other neo-Platonists.14
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theologians of the high Middle Ages is not absolutely new, but new in relation to the immediately
antecedent practices of early medieval theology, limited largely to textual commentary and
interpretation.
 Aquinas quoting John of Damascus at ST 1a, q. 13, a. 11.15
 The Latin text is: “Et sic manifestum est quod relatio realiter existens in Deo, est idem essentiae16
secundum rem … Patet ergo quod in Deo non est aliud esse relationis et essentiae, sed unum et
idem.” ST 1a, q. 28, a. 2.
If the concept or notion of esse subsistens has seemed to reach a
somewhat agnostic conclusion as “having being itself as a kind of infinite and
indeterminate sea of substance,”  what follows from this point is a highly15
detailed account of the nature of subsistent being. What is surprising and often
unappreciated is the way in which Aquinas combines the affirmation that in God
essence and existence are one and the same with an account of this existence in
terms of processional relations. What is of particular importance is that the divine
essence is not the foundation of relations which are conceived as subsequent to
it, but is identified with these relations.
Aquinas makes this point forcefully on more than one occasion. A good
example is the following: “It is clear then that the real relation existing in God is
in reality identical with his essence and differs only conceptually, in so far as
relation implies reference to its counterpart, which is not implied in the concept
of essence. It is clear therefore that in God the actuality (esse) of relation and the
actuality (esse) of essence are not different but one and the same.”  This16
absolutely clear and unequivocal statement of Aquinas is often missed, leading
to profound misunderstandings of Aquinas’s doctrine of God. It is around this key
recognition that the present essay turns.
 The (logically) first procession which constitutes divine life is, for
Aquinas, by way of intellect and is named as the generation of the Word, which
is a perfect reflection or image of divine life reflected into itself, a relation for
which the analogy in the created world is what Aquinas conceives as the “mental
word” or the self-conscious recognition of an act of knowing. This procession is
the philosophical account of what is referred to theologically as the Begetting of
the Son by the Father. This procession leads to a completion in a further
procession by way of will or love and is the presence to itself of divine life as the
beloved in the lover and this procession is the philosophical account of what is
known theologically as the sending of the Holy Spirit. These two processions
exhaust the notion of divine activity. A procession is understood as the movement
of something to something else and is therefore essentially relational in character
rather than substantial, these relations being not only real but subsistent.
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 We have already voiced our questioning as to whether God can literally be spoken of as ‘a being’17
and the medievals often speak of God more technically as ipsum esse subsistens, in which “being”
is used in the verbal rather than the entitative sense. Perhaps the most universally prevalent source
of anthropomorphism in almost any discourse about God, whether everyday or technical, is the
failure to recognise that God is not an entity in the familiar sense. For Aquinas every finite being is
a limited realisation of active existence, whereas God is active existence unbounded by such a
limiting essence. Alternatively God is described as that Being whose essence is identical with
unbounded existence.
Consequently the terms of these relations are described as persons or hypostases,
a term derived from Plotinus but already current in Patristic theology, to account
for the three foci of divine activity. Unlike the use of person to refer to finite
rational beings, the term does not in this case imply individuality, for in God it is
the divine nature which is individual, so that there is only one divine nature which
is identical with the threefold activity of the hypostases. 
The divine “persons” are therefore constituted by their relational activity
and are nothing separate from that activity. Being Father is eternally to be
begetting and is nothing apart from nor prior to this. Being Son is being eternally
begotten and similarly is nothing apart from this; the same point follows for the
Holy Spirit. This complex of relations is not a composition, for God is absolutely
simple and undivided. It is described as a perichoresis or a “dancing around.” The
naming of God as “Lord of the dance” is therefore wittingly or unwittingly
perfectly apposite. The activity is also described as circumincession. 
In describing God and divine activity, new ground is endlessly being
broken, because, perhaps for the first time ever, a ‘being’ is understood in wholly
relational terms.  That is, a ‘being’ here is understood as nothing other than its17
relations. Aquinas and other medieval writers make a distinction between what
they term “essential” and “personal” attributes and they elaborate a highly
developed semantic system in which the essential and personal attributes are kept
clearly distinct. Nevertheless there is never any idea of a divine essence which is
even logically prior to the relational properties: the essence is relational and the
relations constitute the essence. Clearly, this is something other than the
conceiving of finite subjects as constituted by their relations, for in God the
relatedness is not to anything outside himself, not even to the world which he
creates … God is what he is simply in virtue of his eternal, perichoretic, relational
activity. This divine reality is described as complete, perfect, infinite and wholly
self-sufficient. He is, to use the terminology of the Book of Revelation, the Alpha
and Omega, the beginning and the end. 
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Triadic Order and Creation
Nevertheless from the human standpoint God is seen as subject, particularly in
relation to creation. Theology is immediately reminded that its ascent (as far as
reasoning is concerned) to the being of God was precisely from a world of
contingency and finitude which had come to be seen as requiring an ontological
foundation in that which is unconditioned. Indeed the fundamental faith in God
is faith in God precisely as “maker of heaven and earth.” The matter of relating
this unity of perfect and complete activity to a world of finitude requires a new
understanding of this relation of ontological dependence and it would be difficult
to say that medieval theology ever found a way of effecting this transition by
means of deduction or implication. Ontological dependence can be proved by
rational demonstration: creation, at least in the sense understood by Christian
theology, cannot.  For the medievals, only God can create. Yet, whether creating
is part of his nature is another question. God does not need to create and in this
sense, therefore, creating does not seem to be part of his nature. Yet creation can
only come about if God wills it. Further, creation can hardly be viewed as a kind
of optional extra, only accidentally linked to the divine nature. There can be no
division between possibility and actuality in God, because divine nature seems to
exclude the notion of possibility–God is by definition wholly actual. For Aquinas,
the ontological relation of the finite world to God as its source is a relation which
is real in created beings, yet is not a real relation in God.   How this can be, if18
God freely creates the world and does not create by necessity, is a matter of some
difficulty. But it seems to go something like this: It is of the nature of the Good
to communicate itself and this is true not only of the supreme Good but of what
Aquinas here terms “natural” beings, which seek to realise not only their own end
or good and, so far as they can, communicate what they have to others.  By19
analogy, God in his enjoyment of his own perfection also delights in
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communicating this good to other beings by way of participation. He loves them,
however, not as ends in themselves but in relation to his own good.20
Here, as at many other points in this difficult reconciliation of the
philosophical tradition with the requirements of specifically Christian faith in
divine revelation, the strain is felt in maintaining the absolute completeness of a
God who reflects the characteristics of the impassible Good, of the One “beyond
being,” while at the same time maintaining the sheer givenness of the world of
nature and the world of human beings. To put the dilemma in its starkest form,
what scripture affirms is not “that God so loved himself” but that “God so loved
the world that he gave his only son” (Jn 3,16) No doubt, in a system of theology
structured by the neo-Platonic triad of abiding, procession and return it is possible
to reconcile an apparently self-contained complete perfection with its emanative
diffusion in the created world, but whether in the end this does not run into
contradiction, once God’s freedom and love are engaged in the activity of creation
is by no means so clear. In some contemporary theology a good deal of criticism
has been directed to the medieval synthesis, at least as exemplified in Aquinas,
for predetermining our understanding of Trinity and creation by setting up a
Greek philosophical view of God prior to exploring the requirements of a
theology based on history of salvation.  It might be said that Aquinas inherited21
from his neo-Platonic predecessors the problem of making the transition from the
complete self-sufficiency of God, conceived of as the One, to a world
characterised by finitude, contingency and becoming. In one sense this problem
becomes greater and the strain perhaps more evident, once the procession of the
hypostases has been made internal to the divine unity.  For the moment we may22
perhaps put this question of internal strain on hold, while we move on to consider
the way in which Aquinas conceives of this “diffusion of the Good” in creation.
Trinity and Creation: Sending and Giving
Harris148
 See ST 1a, q. 43, a. 2.23
 Readers of Heidegger will notice here an interesting resonance with his treatment of the relations24
of origin in the late essay Time and Being.
Aquinas’s treatment of the Trinitarian life, of the divine persons, processions and
relations, along with all the difficulties of constructing a grammar and a logic
appropriate to the expression of these matters, concludes with a first intimation
of parallelism between the internal Trinitarian life and its deployment in the
created world. In the final discussion of Trinitarian relations (question 43), two
new concepts are introduced which characterise the relations of origin with
respect to the temporal world. Concepts arising from a non-temporal
consideration of the divine relations, thought of as having a term, are generation
and spiration (the word used to refer to the procession of the Holy Spirit), but
along with these, two other terms with a temporal reference are introduced: those
of “sending” and “giving.” These terms refer in the first instance, beyond the23
doctrine of creation in general, to the new ways in which the Trinitarian relations
are reflected in rational beings. They are aspects of the divine immanence in the
created world. The concepts of “sending” and “giving” are introduced at this
point, not primarily in order to give an account of how God creates, but rather in
anticipation of the doctrine of grace and the participation in the divine life which
is accorded to human beings. It seems that the full scope of the immanence of
divine life in the created world is, for Aquinas, only possible where a true image
of the Trinity is found, namely in beings possessed of intellect and will.
Nevertheless, the immanence of God in the world has been announced as, so to
speak, the end-point of creation. In whatever manner the perfection or complete
self-sufficiency of the divine nature is to be properly understood, the movement
towards divine presence in the world of creation is here being clearly signalled.24
The question of divine immanence in the created world is, from the point
of view of this study, one of fundamental importance. If any argument is to be
made that created reality is in some sense an extension of the self-realising
activity of the divine life and that it is driven in its on-going actualisation in a
manner structurally at least analogous with that life, we shall have to give an
account of how and to what extent the essentially relational nature of God is
reflected in his creation. In other words, what we shall be looking for is evidence
of creative immanence in the structure of finite being. Put in another way, we
shall be asking about the analogical resemblance between esse subsistens and esse
commune, or the being which is common to everything in the world of our
experience. 
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 Divine existence and finite existence are, at least for Aquinas,
conceptually related not by identity but by analogy. From Anselm to Aquinas, the
need to get at the difference in meaning between “exist” with reference to God
and with reference to created beings has been seen as a key to non-
anthropomorphic expressions about the nature of God. But, having thus
safeguarded the transcendence of the divine, is it possible nonetheless to give an
account of how finite being is derived from subsistent or infinite being in a way
which allows a pertinent continuity of meaning in the language of existence and
actualization of a kind that excludes mere equivocation?
It might be argued here that Aquinas’s highly metaphysical account of
creation is singularly lacking in the sense of the immediacy of creation and divine
immanence such as we find it in the biblical doctrine of creation. From the “In the
beginning” of Genesis to the “In the beginning” of John, God is everywhere
present and active in the created world. Yet this kind of immediate immanence
never denies but rather underlines the “holiness” of God, and holiness is (at least
up to a point) a religious expression for the more philosophical term of
transcendence. What we are looking for is not the “otherness” of divine existence,
but rather for the continuity in spite of difference between actualization in the
divine and actualization in finite being. In other words, we are looking for the
positive ground for the analogy, rather than the undoubted source of difference.
There are a number of elements in Aquinas’s account of creation which
underline the notion of continuity between divine self-actualization and the
actualization or existence of the world of finite being. The first, and not the least
important is the immediacy with which the treatment of creation succeeds the
treatment of the relational life of the Trinity. (This is one of those instances in
which the logical sequence of the overall synthesis of the Summa Theologica is
integral to the understanding of the detail of the argument) It can hardly be
without significance that just as the relational nature of God was introduced by
the word “procession,” the transition to the doctrine of creation is headed:
“Concerning the procession of created beings from God and of the first cause of
all beings.” This underlining of the notion of creation as procession is
immediately taken up again in the preamble to the first of these questions: “After
the consideration of the divine Persons [not “of the divine nature”] it remains to
give consideration to the procession of created beings from God”  It is true that25
it will often be said that “operations of the Trinity ad extra are of a single
principle”–it is not any particular divine person who creates, but “God” creates.
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But that single principle has by now been shown to be not accidentally triune, but
essentially so. God’s singularity has been shown to be essentially relational in a
threefold way. It would be a mistake to understand it as a kind of “closed shop”
in which the unity of God takes precedence over his threefoldness, or of the
essentially relational nature of that unity. The origin of the finite world is to be
found in a Trinitarian God whose essence is his own relational existence. It is
precisely as Trinity that God creates.26
The second point which underscores the continuity between subsistent
and finite being is the conscious use of the term “emanation” as a way of referring
to creative process. It is not unusual for creation to be understood primarily in
terms of causality; and since causality is nowadays most often thought about in
terms of efficient or effective causality on the basis of physical interaction, it is
often assumed that the doctrine of creation is to be understood as super-effective
efficient causality. The notion of cause here employed by Aquinas is very much
wider. Most importantly it includes the notion of “participation.” It might be said
that the somewhat schematic treatment of divine causality by Aquinas in question
44 is mainly designed to underline the notion that God is not merely the moving
cause of the created world, but that he is the total or universal cause of finite
beings, not just as this or that being or kind of being, but precisely as actual or
existent. It is designed to underscore the theory of participation or derived being,
the point of which is the rather Platonic notion that the intelligibility of all
instances of existing or actualization is a derived intelligibility, reflecting that
which is the principle or source. What is not Platonic in this view is that we are
no longer dealing with Platonic forms nor even with divine ideas in the traditional
sense but the with divine nature in so far as it is participated by beings of every
kind.  Whatever we may be required to say about the essential difference27
between esse subsistens and esse commune, it remains true that esse commune
participates in and therefore reflects the divine being.
The third point which draws attention to the continuity is the retention by
Aquinas of the notion of emanation. The notion of emanation is usually
associated with the work of Plotinus and the other later neo-Platonist
philosophers. Even in Plotinus the word is no more than an analogy, the purpose
of which is to maintain, at one and the same time, the derivation of all subsequent
beings from the One, while at the same time maintaining the un-alteration in the
One as a result of this process or procession. It is not surprising then that it is
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 ST 1a, q. 45, a. 6 and 7.29
 Aquinas does on a number of occasions directly link the “process” of creation with its origin in30
the Trinitarian processions. See, for example, the prologues to the Commentary on the Sentences
retained by Aquinas since the entire theological endeavour is structured on the
triad, monç, proodos, epistrophç, “abiding, procession, return.” The essential
character of creation for Aquinas calls for the deployment of both notions,
causality and emanation: the first in order, among other things, to maintain
(perhaps against the neo-Platonists) divine freedom in creation and the
autonomous reality of finite beings; the second, in order to emphasise the notion
of participation. What we have here is not a contradiction but an indication of the
need for more than one analogy, ostensibly excluding one another, in a way
similar to the complementarity of wave and corpuscular theories of light in
physics. The idea of “universal cause” (the subject of question 44 taken as a
whole), that every aspect of the being of finite reality is derived being perhaps
explains the need for the complementary analogy of emanation. It is not only the28
coming to be or production of finite being which is explained by the causal
relation, but also its formal characteristics and its inherent finality or teleological
character are understood as participations in, and therefore reflections of, the
divine nature.
The fourth point of continuity brings the matter most directly to light.
Under the general heading: “Concerning the manner of the emanation of things
from their first principle,” Aquinas raises two directly Trinitarian questions:
“Whether creation is common to the entire Trinity or is rather proper to a
particular Person,” and following this, “Whether there is a trace (vestigium) of the
Trinity in created things.”  To the first question, Aquinas answers that although29
the principle of creation is the divine essence, and, in that sense, is not proper to
any one person of the Trinity, nevertheless God creates through his own
essentially relational essence, by intellect and will, which is the same as to say
that creation engages not just a single principle, but that single principle precisely
in its Trinitarian structure, and concludes that it is the procession of persons in the
Trinity which is the principle of creation because the processions are the
embodiment of the essential attributes of knowledge and will.  The Plotinian30
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sequence of emanations, having been made internal to, and constitutive of, divine
being, now becomes a unified principle of creative emanation.
To the question as to whether there is a trace or vestige of the Trinity in
created beings, Aquinas replies with a distinction between “trace” and “image.”
It is only in beings with intellect and will that the stronger reflected likeness
(“image”) is found: in such beings there is a similar (analogous) movement of
knowledge leading to a “conceived word” and a “processive love.” A less
complete likeness or “trace” is also found in every finite being.. This consists in
three things: its independent being, its form or species and its order or relatedness
to other things. In this context, Aquinas recalls various other analogous triads in
Augustine: 
It is something It has a form It has a certain order
Number Weight Measure
Manner Appearance Order
It exists It is discerned It conforms
Although all of this may seem to be of rather antiquarian interest, it does
underscore the conviction in both Augustine and Aquinas, that triadic order is not
something to be found only in the revealed doctrine of the Trinity. The essentially
triadic character of order is retained in every finite being, in itself and in its
relations with other beings. The stronger feature of resemblance or “image” is
found in all spiritual or intellectual beings and is the basis for the richer analogy
between intellectual beings and Trinitarian life.
There is a further significant carry-over from uncreated to created being
which does not come out so sharply in the texts of the Summa Theologica with
which we have been primarily concerned. Not only is triadic order carried over
in the movement from uncreated to created being, but so also is the processive
movement itself. This is an important corrective to the common understanding of
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medieval views of the world of finite beings as a collection of particular
substances or entities linked simply by external rather than intrinsic relations to
each other. Although the “physics” underlying the view may be, to the modern
mind, extremely naive, the movement of triadic order is nevertheless clearly
expressed. In a very interesting passage of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas
sketches a theory of universal emanation, or transitive activity, in the created
world. Emanation is seen as the way in which the being of any particular thing is
related beyond itself to the being of other things. It fills out what was sketched in
the Summa Theologica as the essentially triadic order of finite beings. In this
Summa Contra Gentilles passage, Aquinas is laying the foundations for an
apologetic explanation of Christian belief in the notion of divine generation (of
Son from Father) and begins with the least form of emanation–that which is found
in inanimate material beings, in which emanation is limited to the effect such
beings have on others in virtue of their form or structure. Although the example
Aquinas uses is that of fire, it is also presumably true of sticks and stones. In
inanimate beings, the movement of emanation is entirely blind. But with living
or organic life there is already a tendency towards reproduction. But organic
reproduction leads to an externalization of what is reproduced. With sensitive
beings, emanation results also in an inward, reflexive movement yet with
reference to what is external to it–as in minimally conscious sensation. The
argument which proceeds through human and then angelic intellectual life aims
at showing ever increasing immanence of the emanative process to itself or self-
consciousness with a view to finding an argument of convenience to support
Christian belief in the wholly immanent triadic order of the divine personal life.
This transitivity between subsistent being and finite being once again requires
recourse to the principle of bonum est diffusivum sui. Further to this, when
discussing the notion that bonum est diffusivum sui in answer to the question
“Why creation?” Aquinas will build an argument which has as its foundation the
tendency of every being to communicate itself.
What we might conclude from all of this is that one element of the
analogical similarity holding between subsistent or infinite being, on the one
hand, and finite or participated being, on the other, is that the notion of existence,
esse or active being, is its essential transitivity: immanent order is the foundation
of, and ultimately identical with, transitive order. 
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Why is there Creation?
Up to this point we have been primarily concerned with questions of the triadic
conception of the divine nature and of the ways in which this is continued in and
reflected by the world of finite being which is conceived as free causal emanation,
or procession, from and participation in subsistent being. The question cannot be
avoided, however, why there should be a world of finite being at all. If the divine,
perichoretic life is complete and perfect in itself–and Aquinas never thinks
otherwise–and if this divine life is sovereignly free, why should God create at all?
The medieval answer to this question requires that we make a distinction between
God’s nature considered in itself, on the one hand, and in relation to anything
other than himself on the other. The divine processions are neither free nor
necessary. For the generation of the Word to be free would require that we think
of the Father as a subject in his own right. But if the Father is defined purely in
terms of his relative being, as he must be, he does not have that independence of
being a subject in isolation from his relative nature. In other words, the divine
processions are not free. Being Father is not anything prior to begetting the
Word–he just is that. On the other hand they are not necessary either, for there
can be no constraint without a subject to be constrained. So the answer is that in
respect to his own being God is neither free nor necessitated, because the divine
processions and the relations that arise from them are constitutive of the divine
nature. (The sense in which God is thought of as a “necessary being” is not what
is in question here.) Knowledge and love are simply God’s nature and about that
we can say no more. However, if one of the possibilities of that nature is to create
that which is other than himself, God must be understood to be sovereignly and
unlimitedly free with respect to that possibility. We might go on to ask the
question: if God is free to create or not create, if creating is not a necessity of his
nature, what could it be that would move him to create rather than to not create?
Again, the medieval answer is clear: God cannot be moved to act by something
other than or outside himself. Hence it must be something in his own nature
which is the motive force of creation.
When Plato’s demiurge decided to create, it was out of his goodness. But
his goodness was confronted by the chaotic elements and so he willed that they
should become as good as possible and this would be by way of being formed into
a living being with soul and intelligence.  But in the Christian view of creation,31
at least as the medievals understood it, there are no preexistent elements, chaotic
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or otherwise. Creation is ex nihilo–in no way a response to a situation.  God32
cannot create for his own satisfaction, since he is, so to speak, perfectly satisfied
in his own self-completeness or perfection. The principle appealed to is that if we
look more closely at the nature of the Good we find that it is “self-
diffusive”–bonum est diffusivum sui. If God is superabundant and infinite good,
and if it is of the nature of the Good that it, so to speak, overflows, then Good
emanating from its source is necessary and we could then say that creation
follows of necessity from the divine nature. But if, as Aquinas and all the other
Christian teachers maintain, God loves only himself of necessity, and that he does
indeed possess sovereign freedom with regard to anything other than himself, then
it seems necessary to say that, if God wills creation, he does so in relation to his
own goodness, not as its completion (because it is already complete and lacking
nothing) but because it is good to manifest and share it.
This seems to be very close to what Aquinas holds. If, he argues, it is of
the nature of natural beings to communicate their own goodness to others in so
far as they can and their own perfection allows, so much more so must it be true
of God that he sees it as good to communicate his own goodness to others. But he
goes on to qualify this by saying that this communication is not an end in itself
but somehow is subsumed under his own good.  The goodness of self-33
communication is understood as a good intrinsic to the divine nature. It is perhaps
at this point that we witness the strains imposed on the doctrine of creation by the
requirement that the divine nature be viewed not only as perfect and infinite but
with the perfection and infinity of that which is complete in itself. In the last
analysis, it seems that the medievals always draw back from the recognition that
bountiful creation might be as much part of the divine nature as are the immanent,
perichoretic relations of the divine life. In spite of the evangelical renewal which
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was part and parcel of the medieval renewal of theology, the identification of God
with boundless agapeic love seems to be held back precisely by a kind of
withholding which Plato had argued could not be attributed to the “maker and
father of the universe.” The drive towards voluntarism in the developments of
Scholastic speculation subsequent to Aquinas will eventually allow for a new
emphasis on the communication of freedom both in and to creation. This will
result eventually in an entirely new conception of the notion of derived order as
freely self-constructing, rather than as an imposed, pre-conceived order. This
road, however, is an extremely long and tortuous one and the scope of this study
will allow us only to witness the first steps which we identify, to a degree, with
the withering of the notion of form along with a strong move towards
voluntarism, as it occurs particularly in the Franciscan school of thinkers, notably
Bonaventure, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham.
Norman Kretzmann has pointed out that Bonaventure had already taken
steps in this direction by way of placing heavier emphasis on the “productive”
aspect of the principle that the Good naturally diffuses itself.  Less concerned34
with the Aristotelian conception of Good as final cause to the exclusion of
productive causality, Bonaventure sees the self-diffusiveness of God in creation
as following (freely) from the self-diffusiveness which is the goodness of the
divine nature itself, whose goodness is expressed already in the Trinitarian
communicative processions. Aquinas apparently rejected such an account of the
Trinitarian relations on the ground that it would imply that in some sense the
Father already possesses a goodness which he communicates by way of
generation and spiration, thus detracting from the exclusively relational nature of
the divine essence. For Aquinas the perfection or goodness of the divine being is
not communicated from one divine person to another but is rather the perfection
of that self-communication in its fully relational nature. It is not our purpose here
to be waylaid by the small print of Trinitarian theory and for our purpose it is
enough to signal the stronger trend towards voluntarism in the Franciscan school,
while at the same time noting the more thoroughly relational conception of the
triune divine nature in Aquinas. We will look more closely at the medieval
conceptions of the Good in our treatment of the transcendentals.
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Creation and “Divine Ideas”
For Aquinas, the most fundamental source of the world of finite being remains the
infinite divine esse, but now conceived not simply as undifferentiated activity,
but, by way of revelation, conceived as a perichoretic triunity. Creation is in the
first and most fundamental sense a communication of that being. The Platonic
identification of intelligibility with form maintained an important and significant
place in medieval thinking about the intelligibility of the created world. It is true
that for the most part the rediscovery of Aristotle’s more metaphysical writings
had led to an acceptance of his critique of the Platonic teaching and to a
recognition that form exists primarily in particular beings. Nevertheless the
Platonic theory of a world of pure intelligible forms as the exemplars imitated by
the beings of the world of change and becoming was carried over by way of Philo
and of Plotinus into the medieval synthesis. In the doctrine of Trinitarian life, the
divine Word which proceeds by way of intellect is not simply the expression and
reflection of divine being but at the same time includes all the ways in which that
being can be participated by finite beings both as an ordered cosmos and as the
exemplar of all particular finite beings. Allied to the divine will to create such a
cosmos, the Word is seen as essentially creative and the source of the intelligible
nature of the world and all that inhabits it. As we saw, the Trinitarian “trace” in
finite beings consists of their being, their form and their order. Every finite being
is in the first place a particular determination of the activity of existence. This
determination or limitation is its essence or essential nature. This is true of every
kind of finite being, including the purely immaterial or “spiritual” beings, such
as angels. In the case of physical beings this essential nature is a composite of
form and matter, which further limits it or determines it to be this particular,
individual being. The notorious debates in the medieval schools on the nature of
universals is intimately related to the question of the precise nature of this
composition of matter and form in particular physical beings. Three parallel
discussions can be discerned in the evolution of medieval thinking on these
matters: the discussion of divine ideas in creation, the discussion about essence
and individuation and the discussion about the ontological status of universals.
We might say that they are respectively the theological, the ontological and the
logical aspects of essentially the same question. The nature of what are called
“divine ideas”as the exemplars of created beings belongs primarily to the
ontological discussion. The teasing out of these strands is a matter of both
delicacy and complexity and what needs to be said here is simply that from Philo
onwards the divine exemplars of created things are in the mind of God and tend
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to be identified with the divine Word, who is not only the likeness of the unseen
God (Col 1, 15–16; Jn 1, 3), but as these texts suggested, is the exemplar of the
whole of the created world.  The forms, from being the eternally intelligible35
realities of which the world of becoming is an imperfect imitation, have now
become the creative expressions of the divine will freely creating the world and
all that is in it. One might say that the divine ideas are no longer what God
contemplates but are rather the expressions of divine creative will. 
In this progression of the great Scholastic masters the notion of “order”
in the world of finite reality, and along with it, the concept of active existence
have undergone a considerable and portentous change. The later thinkers agree
with Aquinas on the general notion that divine creative activity leaves a trace in
all natural beings and a stronger likeness or “image” in intellectual beings. Their
way of explaining all this is of course different to some extent on account of
systematic differences. Such traces signal the presence of creative power without
really reflecting the Trinitarian nature of the creator, except by way of
appropriation: exemplarity appropriated to the Word, production to the Father and
goodness, or being-ordered-to-an-end, to the Holy Spirit. The notion of
exemplarity is conditioned by the differing emphasis on the role of divine ideas
in creation. This difference underlines the more important movement in the
direction of voluntarism to this extent that an increasing emphasis is placed on
creation as an expression of divine will. An indication that the hold of neo-
Platonic emanation has indeed been broken along with the notion of order based
on form is William of Ockham’s bold assertion that creation in God is a real
relation.  A great deal of significance follows from this for the created order is36
now freed from necessity and becomes a contingent order. For the moment, the
sovereignly independent will of God is what determines the nature of that order.
How that order is to be understood independently of this relation to divine power,
the range of contingency and freedom and the place of empirical enquiry in its
understanding, will become one of the preoccupations of the early modern period
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 Notice once more the parallel with the threefold trace in a very clear exposition of the theory of38
transcendental attributes of being given by Aquinas in de Veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
 ST I q. 5 art. 4 ad. 1 and ST I-IIce q. 27 art. 1 ad. 3.39
and will carry over into the questions about the order of nature which are so
central to Kant, Hegel and Schelling.
Being and its Transcendental Attributes
The essential link that we have tried to establish between the infinite being of the
Creator and the created order can now be seen to consist in three elements: origin,
structure and finality.  To these correspond what have come to be known as the37
transcendental or convertible attributes of being itself. This notion of being as
actualization, as the medievals, following Aristotle, insisted, is not a genus of
which there are specific varieties, because it is logically prior to any such
specification or determination. Yet, far from saying that being is the most empty
and indeterminate of notions, the medievals insisted that wherever there is
existence of any kind at all, there are at least three essential characteristics or
attributes (Scotus calls them passiones). These attributes are variously listed and
numbered (the differences occurring, largely, for contextual reasons). The
simplest version is in direct correspondence with the three elements just listed and
consists in ens, verum and bonum, “being,” “the true” and “the good.” Sometimes
the first, ens is further explicated as res, unum and aliquid or “reality,” “unity”
and “difference.”  The members of this first triad are considered to be absolute38
attributes and the others, “true” and “good” are conceived as relational, in that
true implies a relation to mind and good a relation to will. On occasion, a further
attribute, also relational in nature is added, which is pulchrum, or “the beautiful”
which implies a relation both to mind and to will. Aquinas, for example, defines
the beautiful as id quod visum placet (that which when seen [or perceived]
delights).  It relates to mind as the object of perception and to the will as the39
object of delight.
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The logical peculiarity of the transcendental attributes is sometimes
described as their “convertibility” and phrases such as ens et verum convertuntur
(being and the true are convertible) or ens et bonum convertuntur (being and the
good are convertible) are frequently found.  What this means essentially is that40
these attributes conceptually enrich the notion of being while at the same time not
determining or limiting the notion, but rather explicating it As Aquinas says,
“some predicates may be said to add to being, inasmuch as they express a mode
of being not expressed by the term being.”  Although the convertibility of the41
transcendentals is itself a matter relating to the logical properties of these terms,
this logical property is founded on the transcendentals as ontological properties
or attributes and as such they serve to explicate the full content of esse or being
in the active sense. Although the formal notion of true includes relation to a mind
and that of good a relation to will, these relations have their foundations in the
being of things, and so it is both the case that truth and goodness are real
properties of every being as such and at the same time that they imply a reference
to mind and will. On the strength of this, Aquinas is able to endorse two
apparently conflicting definitions of truth, one of which identifies truth with the
real, the other which underscores relation to a mind.  It is true that Aquinas does42
conclude that the “formal” notion of truth is to be found in the reference to a
mind. If, per impossibile, no mind, not even the divine mind existed, Aquinas
concludes that there would be no such thing as truth. Nowadays, the notion of
ontological truth, that truth is a property of active being, has become strange and
unfamiliar. We are inclined to think of truth as a property of true statements, or
of true propositions. For Aquinas and the other medieval thinkers, truth is
transcendentally convertible with being because being is the foundation and
source of intelligibility. Truth as a property of minds or of propositions, of true
statements or of true beliefs is understood as derivative from this primary sense
of the inherent intelligibility of things which is co-extensive with being.
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Perhaps even stranger to the contemporary mind is the identification of
active being with “the Good.” In contemporary thinking, good in its proper sense
is an evaluative term, both in a very broad sense but also in the narrower context
of ethical or moral value. What we have to think of in the medieval context is not
the good in an evaluative nor in an ethical sense, but in the sense of perfection,
realization or actualization. The modern understanding of evolutionary
actualization has, as one of its dogmas, the exclusion of teleology–actualization
is reduced to “happening” explained solely in terms of antecedent conditions. To
that extent, one sense of the question why things happen has simply become null.
The medieval thinkers were, however, the inheritors of the tradition in which
Plato’s “Good beyond being,” Aristotle’s revision of this as “that at which all
things aim” and Plotinus’s Good as the object of universal desire, constituted the
ultimate explanatory principle of all things. Although they subscribed to the full
range of Aristotelian causal categories, they also accorded a pre-eminence to the
concept of “final” cause as the ultimate answer to the question “why?”
Actualization and perfection in the sense of complete realization were one and the
same, though differing “formally” or conceptually. What the concept of
perfection or the Good adds to the notion of actualization is what we might now
term the dynamic nature of active existence, which is not simply occurrence, but
movement in the direction of completion or fulfilment.
The Franciscan school of thinkers were even inclined to put the Good
ahead of Being (the Platonic influence) as that which is most ultimate in the order
of explanation.  Aquinas’s position on this , following Avicenna and citing43
Aristotle, is clearly that active being is logically the more primitive notion in so
far as intelligibility is concerned, even though from the standpoint of causal
explanation, the Good is primary and has been called the causa causarum.  If the44
activity of actualization (esse) is the most primordial or ultimate notion to which
the speculative thinker can reach, the further question as to why such
actualization occurs calls for an inherent explanatory power which is reflexive.
The answer has to be found, at least as far as the medievals saw it, in what they
termed the Good. The difference to which we have alluded between the
Dominican and the Franciscan schools of thought comes in the end to the question
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whether the Good is to be accounted for by reference to actualization or whether
actualization is ultimately accounted for by the nature of the Good. Either way it
is necessary to inquire a little further into what these thinkers understood by
transcendental Goodness.
Two apparently conflicting accounts could be given of the nature of the
Good. The first, derived from Plato by way of neo-Platonic thought, particularly
from pseudo-Dionyisius, is the notion of the ultimately self-diffusive bonum est
diffusivum sui. This begins from the notion that there is something that we could
refer to as subsistent goodness. Plato’s “Good beyond being” is interpreted in
such a way that being is derived from the Good. The second is drawn from
Aristotle, for whom the “Good is that at which all things aim.” In the medieval
theories of creation, the former would underline the Good as the source of
creation through its own super-abundance; the latter underlines the Good as the
telos inherent in the activity of actualization. Energeia, which is the term from
which “act” and “actualization” are derived, is always movement towards some
kind of fulfilment. The difference has in each case to be reconciled, but it might
be said that at least at first sight, the neo-Platonic principle of bonum est
diffusivum sui might seem to be the more easily reconciled with the requirements
of the Christian theology of creation and the notion of divine generosity. It is
sometimes argued that there is an unresolved tension in Aquinas between these
notions of the Good at least as far as the doctrine of creation is concerned.  This45
may well be true, but is mitigated to some extent by Aquinas’s insistence on the
notion of universal causality as a consequence of which God is understood to be
both the productive and the final cause of created beings.  In other words, God46
as subsistent Good is at once both source and end of finite being–both Alpha and
Omega.
The way in which Aquinas understands this transcendentality of Being,
Truth and Goodness, is qualified by his distinction between esse subsistens and
esse commune. Just as being in these two senses is related by analogy, so too the
transcendental attributes are so linked. The triadic relational structure of esse
subsistens is not simply carried over into the world of finite, created beings,
whose most general characteristic is esse commune, but is realised there in an
essentially participated fashion. Convertibility (in its ontological foundation)
reflects but is not identical with the perichoretic relation of the divine persons but
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it would appear that for Aquinas there is an analogical continuity between them.47
Duns Scotus has insisted, against Aquinas, that being is a univocal notion,  but48
is then forced to maintain the claims of divine transcendence by building into his
theory of transcendental attributes or passiones entis a preliminary qualification
by way of a series of disjunctive transcendentals: every being is either infinite or
finite, necessary or contingent, actual or potential. Either way, created or finite
being reflects divine being and so is both true and good by participation. In the
divine, viewed concretely and personally, truth is appropriated to the divine
Word, which is the expression of divine being and goodness is appropriated to the
Holy Spirit, for which the proper names are “love” and “gift.” Appropriation, in
this context, is a term which is largely unfamiliar to present day readers–at least
in the sense in which it is used in medieval thought. It is really a device by means
of which the medieval thinkers sought to reconcile what were termed personal or
relational attributes with those that were thought of as attributes of the divine
nature or essence in its unity. So, the transcendental attributes of being are
realised both in the transcendent nature of God as ipsum esse subsistens and in
finite beings under the heading of esse commune. God is therefore subsistent
Truth and Goodness and these are properties consequent upon his nature. But as
we have seen, this nature is nothing other than the Trinitarian relations in their
perichoretic inter-relationship. The difficulties involved in giving coherent and
logical expression to all this is recognised, for example when Aquinas discusses
“whether essential names in abstracto can be used to “refer to” (supponere pro)
a divine person.  The difficulties arise precisely from the logical peculiarity of49
a single subject, God, whose essence involves the real distinction of three divine
persons. Appropriation is the ascription of properties which in reality belong to
the essential nature of God (properties pertaining equally to the divine persons)
to particular persons on the basis of a similarity between these common properties
and the particular nature of the distinct processions and relations. So, being truth
and goodness are common properties of the divine nature, yet there is a certain
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fittingness in ascribing being to the Father, truth to the Word and goodness to the
Holy Spirit.50
The resulting semantic problems are considerable. The answer involves
the medieval theory of distinctions. The transcendental attributes are held by
Aquinas to be formally, but not really distinct. This means in the simplest terms
that what is expressed by each is not reducible in meaning, but is reducible in
reference. Being does not just mean the same as thing, true or good, even though
whatever is a being is also true and good in the senses we have been discussing.
This is what is meant by their convertibility. But when these terms are
appropriated to the particular divine persons they are being ascribed to persons
who are really distinct.  We might therefore decribe appropriation as a peculiar51
form of metonymy, of such a kind that the divine Word may be referred to as truth
and the Holy Spirit as goodness or love, even though strictly speaking these
attributes refer to the divine nature considered in its unity.
Summary and Assessment
What I have tried to do in this essay has been to show that the strong theory of
existence operating in the thought of some of Aquinas reveals a number of
important elements in theories of being as active existence which will surface
again at various points in the subsequent history. Many points of detail have been
either skimmed over or even ommitted in the process in the interests of
highlighting features which often become obscured in more detailed accounts of
the various medieval systems. What has emerged, most notably in the doctrine of
the Trinity, is an understanding of existence as activity rather than as essence, or
perhaps better, as an understanding of the mutual interrelationship of essence and
existence. The divine essence has been seen to be not accidentally, but essentialy
a matter of subistent, relational activity, triadic in form and perichoretic in its
internal reflexivity. We have also seen that all finite and contingent existence is
derived from this by way of creation understood as a freely willed participation
in this infinite source of being and that as such finite being reflects and mirrors
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the characteristics of its source and origin. Creation has been found to be not only
causation (and this in an ampliative sense of “universal cause”) but also
“procession” and “emanation.” Although for the medievals this reflection is at its
most complete in rational beings endowed with mind and will, it is nevertheless
genuinely carried over into the ontological structure of all finite beings.52
Although all being ‘outside’ of the originating Trinitarian source is limited by its
finite nature or essence and is therefore essentially dependent being, nevertheless
it has a comparable structure of origin, form and finality (characteristic of the
Trinitarian relations) in such a way that it exhibits the transcendental attributes
of being, truth and goodness. We have seen that in finite beings, existence has
been limited and determined by essence or nature and that this conception of
essence is bound up with the notion of substantial and accidental forms. What is
sometime overlooked, resulting in a static notion of essence, is that the medievals
were operating with the Aristotelian conception of form understood as a principle
of activity. The Platonic notion of form underwent a profound metamorphosis in
Aristotle to become a dynamic principle of self-realisation. In Aquinas, this
activity of form is not cancelled but rather subsumed into the primacy of active
existence or esse. Traditionally much greater emphasis has been placed on the
notion of form as a principle of identity, as the foundation of the quiddity or
nature of a thing than upon form as a principle of active self-realisation.  This53
has resulted in an undervaluation of the continuity between the Trinitarian
processions and the creation of the finite world.
There has been a good deal of misunderstanding of the medieval
distinction of essence and existence, such that existence was understood as an
entirely characterless act, the sole point of which is to activate any particular
essence, conceived as simply a possible nature, with the resulting union giving a
real being. It may well be true that the medieval writers sometimes express
themselves in this way. No doubt many of the problems and confusions
surrounding the question of real versus formal distinction between essence and
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existence are related to the inherent difficulty of constructing an adequate
vocabulary to express the notion of metaphysical principles of being.  However,54
if we take seriously the notion that finite essences or natures are in reality
instances of incomplete participations of existence, or that essence is simply a
particular way in which existence is realised in the contingent world of finite
beings, the matter becomes clearer. Essence is a particular determination of the
activity of esse. It has no reality other than as a determination of active existence.
The gradual but real withering of the notion of form that we have noted in the
progression from Aquinas through Scotus to Ockham witnesses to the recognition
that essence and existence are related in such a way that essence without
existence is no more than the notion of a possible being. There is nothing in the
finite essence which is not derived from the single source of infinite divine
existence, and all the characteristics which it exhibits are determinations of that
existence. Consequently there are no elements in finite beings which have any
other provenance than the creative will of their divine origin. This is the real
import of creatio ex nihilo and of the universal-causal-emanation of the world of
finite beings from God.
 It has to be recognised that in medieval theories, the fundamental
importance of the distinction between subsistent and common existence tended
to produce not a unified metaphysics, but a two-tiered system in which the
principles of the one were not immediately continuous with those of the other.
Although the perichoretic relationality of the divine persons is reflected in and
resonated in finite beings, to degrees varying along the scale of beings from
physical or material beings to intellectual or spiritual ones, it cannot be said that
cosmic process can be cashed out in precisely the same terms; it is always a
matter of analogical similarity rather than of simple continuity. The divine
transcendence is often characterised as an “infinite distance” between God and
the created world. Combined with the notion that the divine perichoresis is
complete and perfect in itself, the never solved problem is how to relate the divine
and created worlds.
Nevertheless, the question could not be shirked and, as we have seen, the
answers most commonly given focussed on the nature of the Good as of its nature
self-diffusive. Although the logical expression is sometimes rather contorted in
order to preserve the ‘infinite distance,’ it is allowed that a fundamental
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characterisation of such self-diffusive goodness is love, which is recognised as the
completion of the divine perichoresis, hence also its initiation. What this really
shows for the medievals is that God does not have to create, but that if he freely
wills to do so, he is still acting ‘in character,’ so to speak. But there is a good deal
to be said for the view that the medievals generally were so impressed and,
perhaps, overawed by the richness of the philosophical heritage of the Greek
world that they failed to give full consideration to the extent of God’s love for the
world, achieving its highest expression in the Incarnation of the divine Word. The
overwhelming concern to guard the rights of divine transcendence could be said
to lead to a systematic undervaluation of divine immanence. In theology this has
almost always remained a matter of high contention, to the extent that even in the
time of Hegel, the charge of pantheism was frequently levelled at attempts to give
full value to the essential interconnection of infinite and finite in the matter of
active existence.
If it has to be conceded in the end that Aquinas never achieved a truly
unified speculative metaphysics, this has to be accounted for in terms of
deficiencies at a number of levels, both theological and what might be called
technical-philosophical. But our concern, in concluding this paper is to underline
the important positive contributions that Aquinas made to the advancement of
such a project. The definition of being as the activity of self-actualization, the
recognition of a triadic order of origin, structure and finality, the elaboration of
a theory of subsistent relations and the interconnective process of causal-
emanation: all these contribute to the possibility of a unified theory of speculative
metaphysics and will reappear in various forms and guises in the on-going history
of such endeavours. The movement towards voluntarism, the recognition of the
univocal nature of being, the abandonment of the more static conceptions of form
and the recognition of a real relation between God and the world of finite,
contingent being, all these developments signalled a direction towards an
increasingly sophisticated speculative metaphysics.
In concluding, it can be noted that the failure to adequately implicate God
in the finite world of contingent being had as a result the gradual relegation of the
doctrine of God to a mere requirement of the understanding of that world in early
modern philosophy and various forms of deism in which the vital relation of the
triune divine nature with the created world faded into a systemic requirement of
a more mundane metaphysic. As Heidegger might have said: what remains
unthought in medieval thinking did indeed lapse into a “forgetfulness of being.”
The purpose here has been to open it up to fresh thought and reflection.
